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Summary findings
More effective development aid could greatly improve  increase the likelihood of sustained good policy (an idea
poverty reduction in the areas where poverty reduction is  ratified in several recent case studies of low-income
expected to lag: Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and  reformers).
Central Asia.  Collier and Dollar find that the world is not operating
Even more potent would be significant policy reform  on the efficiency frontier.  With the same level of
in the countries themselves.  concern, much more poverty reduction could be
Collier and Dollar develop a model of efficient aid in  achieved by allocating aid on the basis of how poor
which the total volume of aid is endogenous. In  countries are as well as on the basis of the quality of their
particular, aid flows respond to policy improvements  policies.
that create a better environment for poverty reduction  Global poverty reduction requires a partnership  in
and effective use of aid.  which "third world"  countries and governments improve
They use the model to investigate scenarios-of  policy  economic policy while "first world"  c  izens and
reform, of more efficient aid, and of greater volumes of  governments show concern about poverty and translate
aid-that  point the way to how the world could cut  that concern into effective assistance.
poverty in half in every major region.
The fact that aid increases the benefits of reform
suggests that a high level of aid to strong reformers may
This paper-a  product of the Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the group to study aid effectiveness.
Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
Emily Khine, roomMC3-347,  telephone 202-473-7471, fax 202-522-3518, email address kkhine@worldbank.org. Policy
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  The authors may
be contacted at pcollier@worldbank.org  or ddollar@worldbank.org. July 2000.  (50 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Sedes disseminates  the  emndings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  aboat
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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1. Introduction
Ten percent of the world's population produces 70 percent of its goods and
services and receives 70 percent of world income - an average of $30,000 per person.  At
the other extreme, half of the world's population lives on less than $2 per day.  How do
we understand this extreme global inequality? And, more importantly, what can we do
about it?
To a large extent differences in productivity and income across countries can be
explained by differences in economic institutions and policies.  Some countries have a
good environment for households and firms to save, invest, and increase productivity,
while other countries have poor environments. Rapid poverty reduction in low-income
countries depends primarily on these countries improving their own policies and
institutions. However, foreign assistance is also important. In an earlier paper we
introduced the concept of the 'poverty-efficiency' of foreign aid: a poverty-efficient aid
program is one which reduces poverty by as much as possible. We showed that both
governments and aid donors have considerable scope to increase the poverty-efficiency
of the current volume of aid. Developing country governments can massively increase
poverty-efficiency by improving the policy and institutional environment. As policies
and institutions are improved, the cost of poverty reduction is lowered, so that for a given
aid volume more people can be lifted out of poverty.  Donors can almost double the
poverty-efficiency of their aid through simple but radical changes in how they allocate
their assistance.  A poverty-efficient allocation of aid would equalize the marginal cost of
reducing poverty across countries.  As long as marginal costs differ, it is possible by
reallocation to lift more people out of poverty with a given volume of aid. Compared2
with the current allocation of aid, donors would need to target aid to poorer rather than
less poor countries and to good rather than bad policy and institutional environments
(Collier and Dollar 2000).
In this paper we apply our approach to the dynamic question of poverty reduction
over the next fifteen years.  The main organization of donors (Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD, or DAC) - in consultation with developing country partners,
and international agencies- has set a specific poverty reduction goal for 2015, namely
that the incidence of poverty should be halved.  Whereas our previous work posed the
question of how current aid programs could have a higher poverty impact and so could
take the volume of aid as a given, our new work takes the international poverty reduction
objective as given.  Hence, in order to meet the international development goal of poverty
reduction, the donor-government partnership has a third potential instrument, the volume
of aid, in addition to reform and aid reallocation. With the volume of aid a choice
variable, the notion of poverty-efficiency must be extended: each of three actors face
decision problems. As in our previous work, we see it as the responsibility of developing
country governments to reform policies and institutions in such a way as to reduce
poverty. It is the responsibility of donor agencies to allocate aid among countries so as to
equate the marginal cost of poverty reduction.  However, additionally, it is the
responsibility of western Ministries of Finance to adjust aid budgets so as to equate the
marginal cost of poverty reduction with the marginal value which western electorates
attach to global poverty reduction.
The first of these decision problems, policy and institutional reform for poverty
reduction designed by the government, is obviously not new since some governments3
have had this as a central policy objective for many years. However, most developing
country policy and institutional environments are currently far from poverty-efficiency so
that there is considerable scope for improvement. We show that whether the international
poverty target is attainable by 2015 is critically dependent upon successful reform. We
consider several policy scenarios. In our baseline scenario current policies persist.  In our
main variant, policy in the regions with the weakest policy, Africa, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, is assumed to improve to the level currently prevailing in South Asia.
The second of the decision problems, aid allocation on the criterion of poverty
efficiency, is more radical. Until recently, the overall allocation of aid had little
relationship to good economic policy, as required by poverty efficiency.'  However, the
concept of poverty-efficient aid allocation has now become considerably more
widespread. Several of the bilateral donors have already changed their aid allocations so
as to make them more poverty efficient and this trend seems likely to continue. By 1998,
a clear relationship between the allocation of aid and the quality of policy had emerged
(Dollar 2000). We will therefore look at scenarios in which donors allocate aid
efficiently, subject to one important and evident political constraint, namely population
bias.  It has long been known that per capita aid receipts are systematically smaller for
countries with large populations. In this paper we accept that bias as a fact of life.  We
estimate the quantitative magnitude of the population bias in current allocations and
assume that it is a persistent feature of aid allocation rules.
The third of the decision problems, equating the benefits of aid expenditure with
its costs, is the most standard of the three.  After all, the core function of Ministries of
Finance is to equate the marginal cost of taxation with the marginal benefits of the4
various components of public expenditure as perceived by electorates.  There is no
particular reason to believe that Ministries have made any greater error with respect to
expenditure on aid than any other component of their budgets.  We therefore assume that
the current volume of aid reflects competent ministerial budget allocation decisions.
Hence, by computing the marginal cost of poverty reduction for the existing volume and
allocation of aid we reveal the current marginal value of poverty reduction to western
electorates.
As reform and reallocation change the marginal cost of poverty reduction at a
given volume of aid, the initial budgetary allocation is plunged into disequilibrium: the
marginal cost of poverty reduction falls below the marginal benefit to the electorate.  The
actual volume of aid should therefore change endogenously. The extent of the change in
the volume of aid depends upon the slopes of the marginal cost and benefit schedules.
Tlhe  slope of the marginal cost of poverty reduction is empirically determined, since as
part of our analysis we estimate the extent of diminishing returns to aid: as the volume of
aid is increased, the marginal cost of poverty reduction increases.  The marginal benefit
schedule is much more problematic.  In effect, we are posing the question of how the
concern of developed country electorates for additional global poverty reduction changes
as the scale of global poverty decreases.  For most components of budgetary expenditure
it is evident that concern diminishes as the scale of the problem is reduced.  If, for
example, the electorate is concerned that there is not enough woodland, or too few
teachers, then as trees are planted or teachers hired, presumably the marginal benefit from
an additional tree or an additional teacher diminishes.  However, in the case of global
poverty reduction it is far from clear that there is such diminishing concern.  Consider the5
following thought experiment. Suppose that instead of there being over a billion people
in absolute poverty, there were only ten million people. Would electorates attach more or
less value per person lifted out of poverty? It is at least arguable that as the absolute
poverty problem diminishes, electorates will come to attach more rather than less value to
solving the problems of those few who remain poor.
In our analysis we will assume that the electorate's marginal valuation of poverty
reduction is invariant with respect to the relatively small changes in the amount of
poverty brought about by variations in the volume of aid budgets.  The consequence of
this assumption is that all of the adjustment back to equilibrium brought about by an
increase in the poverty efficiency of aid is achieved through diminishing returns to aid in
poverty reduction. In graphical terms, a fall in the marginal cost of poverty reduction
schedule leads to an increase in the volume of aid sufficient to move up the new marginal
cost of poverty reduction schedule to the point at which the marginal cost reverts to its
initial level. There are two justifications for this assumption. As the above example
shows, it is not even clear a priori whether the marginal valuation of poverty reduction is
decreasing or increasing in poverty reduction. Further, it seems evident that even if the
schedule is downward sloping, it is much less steep than the marginal cost of poverty
reduction schedule. The latter is steeply sloped because there are evident limits to the
absorptive capacity for aid. We find that once aid exceeds around 10% of GDP
(measured at purchasing power parity) even in good policy environments the marginal
cost of poverty reduction through further aid is prohibitively high.  By contrast, changes
in the volume of aid within the range in which it is productive (i.e. between zero and 10%
of developing country GDP), in the short term have only a small impact on the global6
poverty  numbers. Thus, they  are unlikely  to have  much  impact  upon the concern  of
electorates  for further  poverty  reduction.  Further,  such  changes  in the volume  of aid have
only small  overall  implications  for Finance  Ministry  budgets  and so do not significantly
change  the marginal  cost of taxation. In effect,  the worthwhile  range  of changes  in the
volume  of aid generate  only  'neighborhood'  changes  in electoral  concern  for global
poverty  reduction.  Thus, all the action  is reasonably  focused  upon adjustment  through
the diminishing  returns  to aid in achieving  poverty  reduction.
Our analysis  thus endogenizes  aid volumes  by making  them a function  of changes
in the poverty-efficiency  of aid.  In our baseline  analysis  the electorate's  marginal
valuation  of poverty  reduction  is assumed  constant  over the entire  period 2000-2015  at its
current  (revealed)  level. However,  this  is a very  conservative  assumption  because  the
OECD  economies  are evidently  going  to enjoy substantial  increases  in per capita  income.
The desire  of the electorate  to finance  global  poverty  reduction  is likely  to be a 'normal'
good  with a positive  income  elasticity  of demand. If the motivation  behind  poverty-
Marginal  cost  of poverty  reduction  schedule
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reducing  aid is predominantly  charitable  then  aid is likely  to be highly  income  elastic. It
may  have other  motivations  such  as the perception  that the OECD  societies  are unlikely
to be able  to cocoon  themselves  from the social and environmental  consequences  of
persistent  absolute  poverty,  but again,  such  concerns  may  be income-elastic.  Thus,  in a
variant  we allow  for the possibility  that the marginal  valuation  of poverty  reduction
gradually  increases  from its current  (revealed)  level,  by 3% per annum  through  to 2015.
In the next section  we develop  a baseline  scenario,  in which  countries' growth
rates are projected  forward  based  on recent  growth  experience,  initial  conditions,  and
current  economic  policies. Using the average  relationship  between  income  growth  and
poverty  reduction  in a large  number  of empirical  studies,  we then project  poverty  rates  in
2015. If current  growth  trends  and policies  persist,  it turns out that the world has a pretty
good  chance  of meeting  the international  targets  even  if we do nothing. However,  a
disproportionate  share of the poverty  reduction  takes place  in East and South  Asia. In
this  baseline  scenario,  there is little  poverty  reduction  in Africa,  while  poverty  in the
transition  economies  of Eastern  Europe  and Central  Asia  actually  gets worse. By 2015,
the latter  economies  would  be poorer  than South  Asia.
In section  3 we extend  our earlier  model  of efficient  aid so as to explore  the
dynamic  questions  described  above. We quantify  the population  bias in aid allocations
and  build this in as a persistent  feature  of future  aid allocations  even  as other
inefficiencies  are gradually  removed. We estimate  the current  revealed  marginal
valuation  of poverty  reduction  to OECD  electorates. Because,  as in our earlier  work,  the
effectiveness  of aid in promoting  poverty  reduction  depends  on the policy  and8
institutional  enviromnent,  an improvement  in that environment  induces  an increase  in aid
volumes:  more aid can now be used effectively.
In section  4 we investigate  a number  of counterfactual  scenarios,  focusing
especially  on Africa and  ECA, which  will be the lagging  regions in terms of poverty
reduction,  according  to the baseline  projections.  We investigate  the efficacy  of each of
the three  instruments  for increased  poverty  efficiency:  reform,  aid reallocation,  and
increased  volumes  of aid, representing  the decision  problems  of developing  country
governments,  donor agencies,  and OECD  Ministries  of Finance,  respectively.  Donor
agencies  are shown  to have  substantial  scope  for action. Efficient  aid allocation  alone
could  make  a large difference  in Africa,  doubling  the projected  poverty  reduction.
Without  action  on the part of developing  country  governments,  OECD  Ministries  of
Finance  are found to have  relatively  little scope  for action. Even once donor  agencies
allocate  aid to best effect,  if current  policies  and institutions  in Africa and ECA persist,
there is little  further  gain  from increasing  aid volumes. The poor quality  of policies  and
institutions  limits  the amount  of additional  aid that Africa  and ECA can absorb
effectively.  Developing  country  governments  can themselves  do much  to reduce  poverty.
If Africa  could  achieve  the level of policies  already  in place  in South Asia, that  would
have  a large impact  on poverty  reduction. Further,  it would  create the opportunity  for
OECD  Ministries  of Finance  to have  a substantial  impact. In our final scenario,  with
policy  reform  in Africa and  more concern  from the rich countries,  the reduction  in the
poverty  rate in Africa is nearly  50%. The same  scenario  for ECA also leads  to a
significant  reduction  in poverty  relative  to the baseline  projection.9
The specific  numerical  projections  should  not be taken too literally. However,  the
analysis  of poverty  efficient  aid has four  broad  implications.  First, the international
poverty  goal  is atiainable  globally,  but not in Africa  and ECA unless  there  is major  policy
and institutional  reform  beyond  the relatively  modest  level envisioned  in this paper,
whereby  the two  regions  attain  the level currently  achieved  by South  Asia. Second,  the
analysis  demonstrates  the importance  of partnership.  We consider  the scope  for action  of
three entities:  governments  in developing  countries,  aid agencies  and OECD  Finance
Ministries. As governments  and aid agencies  become  more  poverty-efficient,  the scope
for Finance  Ministries  to reduce  poverty  by expanding  aid budgets  increases. Reform,
improved  aid allocation,  and expanded  aid  budgets  are complements.  Thirdly,  if donor
agencies  are to fulfill  their part in the attainment  of poverty  efficient  aid then one of their
key tasks  is to allocate  aid efficiently,  that is, to countries  that have  high poverty  and
reasonably  good  policies. Note that  these allocations  do not stay frozen:  as some
countries  rise  out of poverty  there  will be a need  for periodic  reallocations.  The high-aid
countries  by 2015  are very different  from those  in 2000. Fourthly,  if aid agencies  and
OECD  Finance  Ministries  become  poverty-efficient  in their  respective  aid decisions,  then
governments  in developing  countries  will face  differing  trajectories  of aid. Many are
currently  receiving  inefficiently  little aid. Such  countries  should  go through  a trajectory
in which  aid first  rises, and then  tapers  out as poverty  is reduced. Others  will face
precisely  the opposite  path  of aid. Their policy  and institutional  environments  are
currently  too poor  for aid to be used  efficiently,  so that in the near future  their aid
receipts  should  be reduced. However,  as other  countries  grow  out of poverty,  and as they
belatedly  improve  their environments,  aid should  rebound. Hence,  the common  principle10
of poverty efficiency in aid implies very different financing scenarios at the level of
individual  countries.
2. Baseline Scenario
What will global  poverty  look like in 2015  if current  trends  persist? To answer
this question  we need information  on expected  growth  rates  of per capita  income  and  on
the elasticity  of poverty  with respect  to mean income. Specifically,
(1)  h =-txG
where  h is the headcount  index  of poverty,  G is the growth  rate of per capita  income,  A
indicates  relative  rate of change,  and a  is the elasticity  of poverty  reduction  with respect
to mean income. (We  prefer to define  a  as the elasticity  of poverty  reduction  with
respect  to mean income  so that a is positive.)
In general  there  is more information  on determinants  of countries'  growth  rates
than on determinants  of poverty  elasticities. We are going  to use for our baseline  a set of
growth  projections  prepared  by Easterly  (1999). He uses a regression  of growth  rates  on
past growth  rates,  initial conditions,  and current  economic  policies  to project the likely
path of growth  rates  if policies  remain  the same. The measure  of policies  that he uses  is
the World  Bank's Country  Policy  and  Institutional  Assessment  (CPIA). Conceptually,
this measure  is trying  to capture  the extent  to which  a country  has a good institutional  and
policy  envirornent for long-term  growth  and poverty  reduction. In practice  it has 20
different  components  covering  issues  of macroeconomic,  structural  policies,  public  sector
management,  and social inclusion.  Each of the twenty  components  is rated ordinally  by
country  specialists,  on a scale  of 1-6,  using  standardized  criteria. Considerable  care is11
taken to ensure that the ratings are comparable both within and between regions.  While
the scores include an irreducible element of judgement, they have a reasonable claim to
being the best consistent and comprehensive  policy data set. The CPIA has the
advantage that it is available for all developing countries, and for our purposes it is
important that all countries be included in the analysis.
Table 1 summarizes the baseline scenario by region. (These are population
weighted averages for the countries in the regions.  We project population by simply
extrapolating the population growth trend of the past ten years.)  In terms of the current
CPLA  measure of policy, Sub-Saharan Africa has the weakest policy, followed closely by
the Europe and Central Asia region. At the other extreme, Latin America has the best
policies, and, despite recent problems in some countries, East Asia fares almost as well.
In our work, described in more detail below, we find that the derivative of growth with
respect to the CPIA is about 1.0, so that the policy difference between Africa and Latin
America explains about 1 percentage point of the difference in their growth rates.
Clearly, other exogenous factors influence growth as well.
The table shows actual per capita growth, 1990-96, and the projection of the
growth rate if policies remain the same. By construction, the projections are not going to
be very different from recent performance. If current trends persist, Africa and ECA will
grow slowly or not at all, while LAC and South and East Asia all do pretty well. The
Middle East and North Africa region's performance is in between (projected per capita
growth of 1.0 percent per annum).
How do we introduce poverty into this analysis? Ideally, we should have country-
specific poverty elasticities. These, however, require detailed information on the12
household distribution of income, and reliable such infortnation is only available for
about half of the countries in the developing world.  In order to maintain comprehensive
country coverage, we are going to rely on a simplifying assumption. In a large number of
empirical cases, the median poverty elasticity was about 2 (Ravallion and Chen 1997). If
we apply a constant elasticity of 2 to all of the countries in our sample, then we get the
changes in poverty rates between now and 2015 indicated in Table 1. (These rates are
headcount poverty based on a $2 per day poverty line.)  Regions with good per capita
income growth should register large declines in poverty (from 85% to 40% in South Asia,
and from 57% to 10% in East Asia). Because these regions have such large populations,
their performance is the key to a large change in the poverty rate for the whole
developing world (from 61% to 3 1%). Thus, if the objective is to reduce the poverty rate
by about half in the developing world, then based on current trends there is a pretty good
chance that this goal will be met.
That global figure, however, disguises the fact that in this baseline scenario there
is very little poverty reduction in Africa, and an increase in poverty in the transition
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Note that by 2015, ECA would be poorer
than South Asia. The remainder of the paper looks at how policy reform and more
effective aid can lead to a better outcome, particularly in these regions.
Before moving on, however, it is necessary to say a few words about the
simplifying assumption that the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to mean
income is constant over time and across countries.  In practice, how would we expect this
elasticity to vary?  In particular, would we expect it to change in response to policy
reforms that enhance growth?  Dollar and Kraay (2000) show that the policies that13
enhance  growth  (captured  in the CPIA)  have no systematic  effect on distribution. (This
means,  incidentally,  that the policies  measured  by the CPIA  have the same affect  on
income  of the poor as on average  income.) Thus, as we examine  scenarios  of policy
reform,  it is reasonable  to assume  that the distribution  of income  does not change. With
an unchanged  distribution  of income,  the elasticity  of headcount  poverty  with respect  to
growth  of mean  income will depend  on the level of mean  income and the shape of the
Lorenz curve. Thus, in practice  the estimate  of 2 will be too low for some  countries  and
too high for others. Certainly,  in looking  at individual  countries  it would  be preferable  to
use the full information  on the Lorenz  curve  where it is available. But, it is reasonable  to
expect  these errors to roughly  cancel  out globally,  so that our approach  is appropriate  for
coming  up with estimates  for whole  regions  or for the whole  world. The only alternative
is to drop some  significant  countries  from the analysis.
3. Allocating  Aidfor Poverty  Reduction
In an earlier  paper we showed  how a more efficient  allocation  of foreign aid could
increase  the rate of poverty  reduction  in the developing  world (Collier  and Dollar 2000).
Here we are going  to build on that framework  to develop a model  in which changes  in
developing  country  policies  and/or changes  in underlying  aid parameters  will lead  to
changes  in the rate of poverty  reduction. We can then use the model  to trace out different
scenarios  in order  to understand  better  what changes  are needed  to bring about more  rapid
poverty  reduction.
The projections  that we began  with in the previous  section  do not explicitly  take
account  of aid; that is, they implicitly  assume  that the current volume  and efficiency  of14
aid persist.  And they explicitly assume that policies remain the same. So, we are going
to add to the baseline projections estimates of the impact of policy change and more
efficient aid.
Our starting point is the finding that (1) the efficiency of aid in the growth process
depends upon the policy environment (aid is more effective in raising growth the better is
the policy environment) and (2) aid is subject to diminishing marginal returns (Burnside
and Dollar, forthcoming). Thus, growth (G) is a function of exogenous conditions (X),
the level of policy (P), the level of net receipts of aid relative to GDP (A), the level of aid
squared, and the interaction of policy and aid: 2
G = c + b1.X + b2.P + b3.A + b4.A 2 + b5.A.P  (2)
The coefficient on the interaction term, b5, addresses that the hypothesis that the
effectiveness of aid depends on the policy environment, while the coefficient on the
quadratic, b4, will pick up any diminishing returns to aid.  The coefficient on aid, b3, may
be positive, negative or zero depending upon the importance of policy for growth.  When
it is zero it implies that in the best policy environments, scored as 6, the initial
contribution of aid to growth is six times as large as in the worst policy environments,
scored as 1. When it is positive it implies that the growth differential is less than six, and
when it is negative it implies that the differential is greater than six.  Thus, unlike the
other variables, neither its sign nor its significance constitute tests of the hypotheses.
Table 2 column 1 presents the OLS results for the estimation of (2) in a large
sample of countries.  We have averaged growth and other variables over four-year15
periods beginning with 1974-77 and ending with 1994-97; we have 349 observations. To
capture initial conditions we have initial income, a measure of institutional quality from
Knack and Keefer (1995), and regional dummies (not reported).  There are also period
dummies to account for the world business cycle.  The most significant variable in the
regression is the interaction of aid and policy, with a positive coefficient, significant at
the 1 percent level.  The CPIA measure of policy also enters directly with a positive
coefficient, and marginal significance. Aid and aid squared both enter with negative
coefficients and are jointly significant. However, the coefficient on aid itself, b3, is not
significantly different from zero, and since the variable is not intrinsic to the hypotheses
it is dropped in the interest of parsimony. In this second regression, reported in column
2,  the t-statistics on policy, the policy-aid interaction, and aid squared all increase, with
the two latter being significant at 1%. Thus, the marginal impact of aid on growth
depends positively on the policy environment and negatively on how much aid a country
is getting (diminishing returns).  Specifically, the marginal impact of aid on growth is
estimated to be:
Ga =  0.185P - 0.072A  (3)
The positive coefficient on the interactive term also means that the impact of
policy change on growth depends on how much aid a country is getting; that is, the
derivative of growth with respect to the CPIA measure of policy is
Gp =.64 +.18A  (4).
At the average level of aid (2 percent of PPP GDP), this derivative is 1.0. At a higher
level of aid (for example, 6 percent), the derivative would be larger: 1.7. The general16
point is that the combination of good policy and high aid is conducive to growth and
poverty reduction. One reason for this is that in a good policy environment, aid "crowds
in" private investment, whereas in a poor policy environment aid crowds out private
investment (Dollar and Easterly 1999).
Based on the regression in column (2), we can also calculate the discrete changes
in the growth rate that would result from discrete changes in policy and/or aid.
The changes in aid that we want to consider are ones that arise from a more
efficient management of aid. Specifically, how should the world allocate aid in order to
have the maximum effect on poverty reduction? We set up this problem as
Max Poverty Reduction =  G'  a,' h' N'  Ni-
Subjectto  A'y'  N'=A,  A'  0  (5)
where
y  is per capita income
A  is the total amount of aid
h  is the headcount index of poverty
a  is the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to income
N  is population,
1  indicates the degree of preference for small countries, and
the superscript "i" indexes countries. From above, we know that growth is a function of a
country's policy and the amount of aid it receives.
Compared to our first paper, we have made one important change here, which is
to add the term population raised to the negative  ,B. If that term is omitted, then the
maxinmization  problem is to allocate aid in order to have the maximum effect on poverty17
reduction,  treating  the poor everywhere  the same. The result of that optimization  is to
allocate  far more of the world's aid to very populous  countries  than is the current
practice. In fact, India would  receive  two-thirds  of all aid following  that approach. We
viewed  that as politically  unlikely,  and then constrained  India to its actual level of aid.
The issue  more generally,  however,  is that  there is a bias in aid allocation  in favor  of
small countries,  and we have decided  here  to take that as an expression  of donor
preferences. Adding  the term  N-  to the optimization  accepts  this reality. Formally,  it
says that donors  put more weight  on a poor  person  in a small country  than a poor person
in a large country,  and the parameter /8 captures  the extent of this small country  bias.
Considering  for the moment  only interior solutions  (in which each country  gets
some  aid),  the first order  conditions  for a maximum  are
G,  'h'  hN'  Ni  = Ay'  N'  (6)
or
G.' a'(h'  / y'  =  Nga  (7)
Where A is the shadow  value of aid. If there is no population  bias (0 =0) then A has a
simple  interpretation:  it is the marginal  efficiency  of aid, that is, the number  of poor
people  lifted  out of poverty  through  an additional  million  dollars  of aid. Its inverse  is the
marginal  cost of poverty  reduction. Efficiency  requires  that the marginal  cost be equated
in all countries. With population  bias the interpretation  of A is more  complicated. Its
inverse  is the marginal cost of poverty  reduction  in a country  with population  of 10
million;  efficiency  now  requires  that that marginal  cost be higher in countries  with
smaller  populations  (where  the world  values the poor more) and lower in countries  with18
larger populations (where the world values the poor less). What is equated across
countries by the optimization is the marginal cost of poverty reduction adjusted for
population preference.
Using the estimate of Ga from (3) above, we can solve explicitly for each
country's aid receipts as a function of its policy, population, poverty level, per capita
income, and elasticity of poverty with respect to income:
A' = 2.6 p'  - -.  -j'  N  ~  (8) .07a'  Y'  8
We have information on policy, poverty, and per capita income.  To actually calculate the
optimal aid allocation for each country we need estimates of a  and  /3 and to make an
assumption about A.  As noted, we assume that the elasticity of poverty with respect to
mean income, a,  is constant and equal to 2.
Let us turn now to a plausible estimate of the population bias parameter, ,B.  It is
interesting (and convenient for us) that population is uncorrelated with policy and with
poverty. Thus, if ,B is set equal to zero, there is no significant correlation between
optimal aid to GDP and population. In practice, in 1996 the correlation of Aid/GDP and
log population was -.38 (big countries got less aid). Through trial and error, we choose
,/  to be .32, which yields an allocation of aid that is also correlated with log population,
-.38; that is, we choose /3  to preserve the actual bias in aid allocations.  (The fact that
population is uncorrelated with poverty and policy is convenient, because setting 6  = .32
then preserves both the bivariate correlation between aid and log population and the
partial correlation after controlling for poverty and policy.) To summarize on this issue
of population bias: we are accepting as an expression of donor preferences the actual bias19
in aid allocations against large countries. We are not in favor of it; it is something that
we simply take as an aspect of reality. Our model then allocates aid as efficiently as
possible, accepting this bias.  We will show in a moment that the issue is only important
for very small countries and for very large countries.
Now turn to the parameter, A, the shadow value of aid. In our first paper, we
took as given the actual volume of aid in the world, in which case  A is determined
endogenously. But in projecting aid and its effect out fifteen years, we prefer to move
away from an ad hoc assumption about the volume of aid.  So we are going to think of
the marginal cost of poverty reduction (the inverse of A) as actually reflecting the
marginal utility of poverty reduction to taxpayers in the wealthy countries that give aid.
If first world governments are efficient, then they should give aid up to the point at which
the marginal cost of poverty reduction equals its marginal utility to a representative
taxpayer.
What is the marginal cost of poverty reduction (or its inverse, the marginal
efficiency of aid), given the actual distribution of aid and current levels of poverty and
policy?  It can be calculated from our model. The marginal efficiency of aid is the left-
hand side of equation (7). Table 3 lists virtually all of the countries in the developing
world, their policy ranking, poverty rate, and estimated marginal efficiency of aid given
actual aid allocations. Column 5 shows the estimated poverty impact of an additional
million dollars of aid. In Column 6 this is adjusted for population preference. The
current allocation of aid is inefficient from a poverty reduction point of view because
these marginal efficiencies vary enormously. The marginal efficiency is high in Uganda,
a country with high poverty, good policies, and only modest amounts of aid. The20
marginal efficiency is much lower in Zambia, also a poor country, but one with weaker
policies and far more aid than Uganda receives.  So, there is no single answer to the
question, what is the marginal cost of poverty reduction at present.  However, an average
answer can be found by taking the aid-dollar weighted average of the marginal costs
across countries.  Since we accept the actual bias against large countries as an expression
of donor preferences, we use column 6 for this.  We find that the typical aid dollar is
associated with a marginal cost of poverty reduction of $6,293; that is, a one-time gift of
$6,293 leads to one person permanently moving out of poverty.  (Strictly speaking this is
the marginal cost of lifting one person out of poverty in a country with 10 million
people.)
We are going to take that average figure as an expression of the marginal utility of
poverty reduction to first world taxpayers, and use its inverse as the estimate of A in
equation (8). We should be clear that we are thinking of this primarily as a normative
model.  If we approach poverty reduction efficiently, then we need some sense of its
marginal value and we should allocate aid among countries to equalize the marginal cost
of poverty reduction at a level equal to this marginal value.  But this approach may also
turn out to be a good positive model of aid-giving.  It is suggestive that countries that
have relatively poverty-efficient aid, such as the Netherlands or Sweden, tend to give a
larger amount of aid relative to their income.  An interesting idea to explore in future
work is that in fact more efficient aid calls forth a higher volume of aid. For the moment
we take that as given, based on the logic of our model.
This seemingly small change is an important deviation from our first paper.
Notice what it means in the case in which a particular country improves its policies.  Start21
at an equilibrium  in which equation  (8) is satisfied  for all aid receivers,  and then  imagine
an improvement  in policy  in one country,  j.  This disturbs  the equilibrium  because  the
marginal  efficiency  of aid is now higher  here than in other  countries. If one takes the
total volume  of aid as fixed, then the only way to restore  equilibrium  is to take some  aid
away  from all other countries  and give more  to country  j.  With total aid fixed, A is
endogenous  and has to adjust  upward  to restore  equilibrium.  Alternatively,  if the
marginal  cost of aid is taken as fixed, then  the total volume  of aid is endogenous.  If
country  j reforms,  more aid can be used productively  there, and in our model  it will be
forthcoming.
There are two aspects  of the allocation  rule, equation  (8), that donors  may  not
like. From the point  of view of donors,  it takes  both policy  and the elasticity  of poverty
with respect  to income  as given. Thus, it gives  donors  what they might perceive  to be a
minor  role in the development  process:  to identify  good-policy  environments  and send
checks. A lot of development  assistance,  in fact, is targeted  to promoting  policy  reform
or to providing  specific  services  that  benefit the poor. However,  the research  evidence  is
that donors  have  not had a lot of impact  on policy  (at least, not positive  impact)  and that
their money  is often  fungible,  that is, financing  the whole  public  sector, not necessarily
the project  that they have associated  themselves  with. 3 A recent study of aid and reform
in Africa,  however,  concludes  that donors  could  have more systematic  impact  on policy  if
they  followed  the kind of allocation  rule above:  increasing  aid as policies  actually
improve  (Devarajan,  Dollar,  and Holmgren  1999). Furthermore,  if the policies  that are
supported  in this way include providing  important  public services  that benefit the poor,
then countries  with good policy  may  have  higher elasticities  of poverty  reduction  with22
respect to growth. In either case, the poverty reduction benefit  from moving to our
allocation rule will be larger than what we project.  Thus, our estimates can be taken as
conservative, and indicative of what aid is likely to achieve if donors have no influence
over policy, including policies that increase the poverty elasticity.  To the extent that
supporting good, poverty-reducing policies solidifies those policies, the actual benefit of
aid will be higher.
The final step in this section is to calculate the country-by-country allocation of
aid based on the rule in equation (8). Countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia could
effectively use a lot more aid than they currently get (Table 3).  Some poor countries,
such as Angola, have extremely poor policies, and would receive less aid in our
allocation than they actually get. Most of the truly poor countries receive significant
allocations. Compared to the actual allocation of aid, our allocation (1) has the same
relationship with population, (2) is more sharply targeted to poor countries, and (3) has a
stronger relationship with policy.  (In fact, the actual allocation of aid in 1996 had no
positive relationship with policy.)  The total volume of aid for the countries in our sample
was $38 billion in 1996. It would take $56 billion allocated by our rule to achieve the
same average efficiency. 4 Thus, one way to think about the static efficiency gain from
our approach is that it would permit a 50% increase in aid absorption, without reducing
the marginal efficiency of the typical aid dollar!
Finally, we want to say something about the sensitivity of the allocation to the
choice of ,B, the population bias parameter. Table 4 focuses on several countries with
different population sizes.  It shows the allocation of aid for each country under three
different choices for ,B: 0, .32., and .6.  For Namibia (with 1.5 million people) and India23
(with nearly a billion), the choice makes an enormous difference.  For countries with
populations between 5 million and 75 million (which is the vast majority of countries), on
the other hand, the choice of ,B does not make a large difference.
4. Scenarios  of Aid and Reform
The previous section provides a toolkit that we can use to assess the impact of
altering key assumptions that underpin the baseline scenario of what poverty will look
like in 2015.  In particular, the four counterfactual scenarios that we will investigate are:
*  #1: Efficient aid: hold policy constant and allocate aid efficiently year-by-year based
on the algorithm in the previous section;
*  #2: Efficient and more generous aid: hold policy at its current level, allocate aid
efficiently, and allow the marginal utility of aid to rise over time (more concern from
the first world);
*  #3: Efficient aid and policy reform: assume that policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and
ECA attains the average level in South Asia, and allocate aid efficiently as in secnario
#1; and
*  #4: Policy reform plus efficient and more generous aid: combines the policy reform
of #3 above with the efficient and more generous aid of #2.  (You could call this the
"partnership approach": third world governments provide good policies while first
world governments ensure adequate aid, efficiently managed.)
In each case the model works as follows: We start with current levels of poverty and
per capita income.  Given the assumptions about policy and A, aid in the first year is
allocated according to equation (8).  The new aid allocation (and better policies, if that is
part of the scenario) implies a change in the growth rate of per capita GDP and of24
poverty, relative to the baseline. The new data on per capita GDP, poverty, and
population are used to calculate the allocation of aid in the second year; and so on until
2015.  Thus, for a country that is growing well, poverty will decline and its allocation of
aid will decline over time.
The model generates several different types of results that are interesting. First,
we will look at the overall impact of the different assumptions about aid and policy on
poverty rates in 2015.  Second, we will look at how the total volume of aid varies among
the scenarios and over time.  Third, we will pick out several different types of countries
(reformers, laggards) to illustrate what the model means for aid flows to particular
countries.
A. Impact on Poverty
Our greatest interest is in what happens to poverty rates under the different
scenarios. Table 5 repeats the poverty rates for each region and what is projected to
happen to the poverty rate under the baseline scenario and under each of the four
counterfactual scenarios outlined above. The first counterfactual scenario tells us, given
policy in the developing world and the level of concern in the developed world, how
much mileage would we get from more efficient allocation of aid.  More efficient aid has
a large impact in Africa.  Whereas the baseline projection is to go from a poverty rate of
72% today to 64% in 2015, the "efficient aid" projection doubles the decline in poverty,
so that the rate would be 56% in 2015.  The other region in which there is an impact is
ECA: under the baseline scenario poverty is projected to increase from 28% to 43% of
the population. With efficient aid, the increase is limited and poverty only reaches 41%.
Note that for the developing world as a whole, efficient aid makes only a small difference25
(poverty  rate reaches  30% in 2015, compared  to 31% in the baseline). The reason  for this
is that, even  if allocated  efficiently,  aid plays a minor  role in Latin America  or East Asia
(though  of course  there are individual  countries  in which  aid is important). For the
Middle  East-North  Africa  region,  efficient  aid actually  makes  things worse,  which may
seem surprising. But in that  region the main  effect  of efficient aid is to reduce  the large
volume  of assistance  to Egypt. Finally,  there is only a modest  increase  in poverty
reduction  in South Asia as a result of efficient  aid. By accepting  the population  bias that
we find in actual  aid allocations,  we preclude  giving  a large amount  of assistance  to
India, which  has 75% of that region's population.
Thus, efficient  aid makes a big difference  for poverty  reduction  in Africa,  and
also  reduces  the increase  in poverty  in ECA. Keep  in mind  that, in the way in which  we
have defined  efficient  aid, the total volume  of aid is endogenous. What is kept constant
in the last scenario  is the marginal  cost of poverty  reduction,  which we take as an
expression  of the marginal  utility of poverty  reduction  to first world taxpayers;  in some
sense,  it measures  the amount  of concern  about  poverty  in rich countries. The next
scenario  that we explore  asks,  what would  happen  if there were more  concern. There are
a number  of ways that we could model  this. We choose  to let the marginal  cost of
poverty  reduction  increase  at 3% per annum  (from  around $6,000  today  to nearly  $11,000
in 2015). The rich countries  are going  to be getting  richer. If poverty  reduction  is a
normal  good,  then the marginal  utility of poverty  reduction  should  be increasing  with
income.
In this second counterfactual  scenario,  the poverty  rate in Africa is now projected
to decline  to 53%, compared  to 46% in Scenario  1. It is interesting  that efficient  aid26
makes a much larger difference than this degree of "greater concern."  Our interpretation
of this is that, once we move to efficient aid, there are not a lot of great additional
opportunities to support poverty reduction, given the state of policies in the developing
world.  (The conclusion of course would change if the donors reduced their population
bias and gave more assistance to populous countries.)
The third counterfactual scenario introduces policy reform but returns to the
assumption of scenario 1 that the marginal cost of poverty reduction is constant.  In terms
of policy and poverty trends, the problem regions are Sub-Saharan Africa and ECA.  So,
we look at the following reform counterfactual: what if Africa and ECA attained the
average policy level of South Asia?  Since South Asia is today a poor region, this amount
of policy reform seems like a reasonable aspiration. 5 The way our model works, better
policy will lead to faster growth and poverty reduction directly, holding the amount of aid
constant.  It will also call forth a greater volume of aid, for a given level of "concern" of
the rich countries.  Intuitively, better policy increases the marginal impact of aid, and
more aid would then be required to bring the marginal impact back in line with the
constant marginal utility of poverty reduction.
In the better policy scenario, the poverty rate in Africa declines to 45%.  This is
best compared to scenario 1, which also has a constant A.  Thus, starting from today's
poverty rate of 72%, efficient aid takes the region to 56% poverty, while efficient aid plus
policy reform reduces that to 45%.  Given efficient aid, the amount of policy reform in
scenario 3 makes a much greater difference than the amount of "extra concern" built into
scenario 2.  For the ECA region as well, policy reform on-top of efficient aid, makes a
significant difference.  By construction, this scenario cannot be different from scenario 127
for any of the other regions.  If the total volume of aid were held constant, then policy
reform in one region would require taking aid from other regions to maintain the
efficiency conditions. However, by holding A constant, the amount of aid to one country
or region is delinked from the amount going anywhere else.  Since in scenario 3 the
policy of all regions other than SSA and ECA is unchanged from scenario 1, there can be
no change in the projections for them.
Finally, we have what we call the "partnership" scenario in which the lagging
regions ECA and SSA reform their policies as in the scenario immediately above, and
donor "concern" grows over time as in scenario 2.  In this case the poverty rate in Africa
declines to 41% -- not quite a 50% decline from the current 72%, but pretty close.  Note
that the changes from scenario 1 to 2 and from scenario 3 to 4 both involve increasing
donor concern while holding policies constant.  There is a larger change in the 3-4 move
than in the 1-2 move, because the better policies in the 3-4 scenarios provide a more
fertile ground for effective aid. The general point of our whole model is that third world
policies and first world concern interact in a positive way.
Obviously, these scenarios should be taken as illustrative, rather than literally.
Nevertheless, the final scenario paints a pretty good picture of the world, compared either
to reality today or to the baseline projection of poverty in 2015.  In the "partnership"
scenario, developing world poverty is reduced by more than 50%, and the distribution of
poverty is far more regionally balanced than in the baseline.  In particular, there is less
concentration of poverty in Africa and ECA.  While the specific numbers should not be
taken too seriously, we believe the qualitative conclusion that this kind of outcome
depends primarily on policy reform in Africa and ECA, maintaining (and ideally28
improving) policies in other developing regions, efficient management of aid, and a high
level of concern about poverty on the part of the wealthy countries.
B.  Volume  of Aid
There continues to be a lot of debate about how much aid the rich countries
should provide.  One of the features of our model is that it makes the total volume of aid
endogenous, depending in particular on the amount of poverty in the world, the quality of
policies in poor countries, and the level of concern in rich countries (marginal utility of
poverty reduction to first world taxpayers).  Figure 1 shows the total volume of aid in
each of our four counterfactual scenarios.
Scenario 1 holds constant the marginal cost of poverty reduction.  In this case the
volume of aid declines over time.  The reason is simple: poverty is actually being reduced
in these scenarios, so that - everything else equal - the marginal cost of poverty reduction
would rise, violating the equilibrium. Because of diminishing returns, the equilibrium is
restored through smaller aid flows. Intuitively, if we require a constant marginal
productivity of aid dollars, aid will have to decline as poverty is reduced; that is, as
poverty is reduced, it will be harder and more costly to achieve further poverty reduction.
Scenario 2 holds policy constant, but adds the plausible assumption that, as
developed countries become richer, they will be willing to pay more for a given amount
of poverty reduction.  Here the total volume of aid grows over time, because the growing
marginal utility of poverty reduction more than offsets the tendency for poverty reduction
to become more expensive as poverty is reduced.  If one were to calculate aid dollars
relative to the number of poor people in the world, it would be sharply rising in scenario
2 because the dollars rise while poverty declines quite significantly.29
The only difference between scenario 1 and scenario 3 is that the latter assumes
better policy in SSA and ECA.  Note that this initially calls forth a significantly higher
aid flow - about 20% higher.  This feature of the model is one that we want to promote to
donors: that the flow of assistance should be commensurate with opportunities for
poverty reduction in the developing world.  Policy reform creates a better environment
for poverty reduction and for aid effectiveness, so more aid can be used at the same level
of effectiveness.  Note, however, that the decline in the aid volume over time in scenario
3 is quite sharp, and that by 2015 the volume of aid in scenarios 1 and 3 is about the
same. What is happening here is that the combination of better policy and more aid in
scenario 3 leads to faster poverty reduction than as in scenario 1.  By the time we get to
2015, scenario 3 has better policy but less poverty, which together call forth about the
same volume of aid as scenario 1. In scenario 4, the growing marginal utility of poverty
reduction offsets the effect of reduced poverty, so that the level of aid rises.
C. Country  Examples
A final insight into how the model works can be gained by pulling out some
specific country examples.  We are going to use Uganda as an example of a country that
has good policy today and bright prospects for poverty reduction.  Kenya has relatively
poor policies as of 1999 and gets a small amount of aid in practice.  We are going to look
at what would happen in our model if Kenya had a serious reform program over the next
five years.  Finally, we are going to consider what will happen if Angola's extremely
poor policies persist.
Our model suggests that Uganda should be getting a lot more aid than it gets
today.  It is a country with good policies and a high degree of poverty.  But while it30
should get a lot of aid today, in scenario 1 its volume of aid drops pretty sharply and
reaches zero by 2011 (Figure 2).  The reason for this is that poverty declines rapidly in
this scenario, so that by 2011 Uganda would not be an especially poor country in the
developing world.  In scenario 2, with growing marginal utility of poverty reduction, the
decline is less steep, but still by 2015 aid to Uganda is finished.  This highlights one
important feature of our model, which is that successful countries should "graduate" out
of the aid recipient status, over, say, a 15-year period. Note finally that while Aid/GDP
declines monotonically, aid in dollars first increases (up to about 2005) and then declines.
Thus, part of the decline in Aid/GDP arises from the rapid increase of Uganda's  GDP that
accompanies this scenario.
Figure 3 shows the trends in the poverty rate of Uganda under the baseline and
scenarios 1 and 2.  If Uganda continues to grow as it has, there will be rapid poverty
reduction under any scenario.  What is achieved by efficient aid is to accelerate this
process.  The observant reader will notice that the projected poverty rate in Uganda in
2015 is actually lower in the baseline scenario than in scenario 1. The baseline is holding
constant the actual level of aid to GDP that the country received in 1996 (3.3% in the
case of Uganda).  That is probably not a realistic assumption if in fact Uganda does as
well as projected, but the constant 3.3% per year in aid is a useful reference point.
Relative to that, our efficient aid model would give more aid to Uganda today, but less
aid in the future as poverty actually comes down.  In the two cases, where Uganda ends
up in 2015 is about the same, but the efficient aid scenario shifts some of the poverty
reduction forward in time: peoples' lives are improved sooner rather than later.31
Let us turn now to Kenya.  What would the pattern of aid look like if that country
- which has poor policies today -- reformed?  Specifically, we consider the following
counterfactual: suppose that over five years Kenya gradually achieved the level of
policies that Uganda currently has.  In our model, aid to Kenya would increase during the
period in which policies were actually improving (Figure 4).  If policies stabilized at a
high level, the trend in aid would then look like Uganda's, because poverty would be
declining over time.  This pattern has important implications for donors and the Bretton
Woods institutions.  If donors follow our advice, they should be increasing aid to a
country during the years of a successful reform program.  To the extent that this aid is
properly accounted for in the government budget (as it should be), there will an increase
in the measure of the budget deficit that does not include aid grants as revenue.  (There
would be no change in the measure that does include grants as revenue.)  Furthermore,
there is likely to be a growing external deficit if the aid is financing productive
investment that has a high import content.  Thus, it is important that a "good policy
package" not be defined as a narrowing of fiscal and external deficits.  In our framework,
good policies are ones that are conducive to long-term growth and poverty reduction.
Low-income countries with such policies can absorb a high volume of assistance
efficiently.  If donors follow our advice and give small amounts of aid to countries with
very poor policies, then reform programs should typically be accompanied by increasing
fiscal and external deficits!
What about countries that persist with very poor policies?  Frankly, our model has
no easy answer for them.  Certainly we hope that Angola finds it way to reform. But
suppose its very poor policies persist.  In our model Angola would get a modest amount32
of aid today (about 1 percent of GDP),  and this aid would  increase  modestly  over time in
scenario 1 (Figure  5). The aid dollars  increase  modestly  over time because in this
scenario  Angola  is becoming  poorer  every  year. Aid to GDP increases  even more
because  GDP is declining. The world  being more  concerned  (scenario  2) only makes a
small difference. In our model,  the marginal  impact  of aid in Angola is small because  of
poor policies,  so that, regardless  of their  level of concern,  rational  donors  are not going  to
put a lot of money  into that environment.
5.  Conclusions
Poverty reduction - in the world or in a particular region or country - depends
primarily  on the quality of economic  policy. Where  we find in the developing  world
good environments  for households  and firms  to save and invest, we generally  observe
poverty  reduction. Foreign  aid can accelerate  the process. It can assist the government
and the society  to provide  public services,  including  critical ones needed  by poor
households  to participate  in the market economy.
In this paper we developed  a model  of efficient  aid in which  policy and aid
interact  in several  important  ways:
*  aid increases  the benefits  from good policy,  while at the same time good policy
increases  the impact  of aid; thus, the combination  of good policy and aid produces
especially  good  results in terms of growth  and poverty  reduction;
*  by introducing  the concept  of the marginal  utility of poverty  reduction  to first world
taxpayers,  we make the volume  of aid endogenous;  in particular,  it increases  when33
policies are improved, because in the better policy environment more aid can be used
effectively;
*  we assume that policy is determined by developing country political processes and is
independent of aid; however, the fact that aid increases the benefits of reform
suggests that a high level of aid to strong reformers may increase the likelihood that
good policy is sustained (an idea ratified in a number of recent case studies of low-
income reformers); to the extent that this is the case, our estimates of the benefit of
aid to good policy countries are too low.
The main conclusions of our work can be shown in a simple diagram, which could
represent an individual country or a whole region such as Africa (Figure 6).  On the
vertical axis is a measure of developing country policy, and on the horizontal, a measure
of first world "concern" (marginal utility of poverty reduction).  The isoquant traces out
combinations of policy and concern that would achieve a certain level of poverty
reduction (for example, 50% by 2015).  Our first finding is that we are not operating on
this efficiency frontier.  With the same level of concern, we could achieve much more
poverty reduction by allocating aid on the basis of how poor countries are and the quality
of their policies.  That change alone would double the projected poverty reduction for
Sub-Saharan Africa; it would put us at a point such as "A" on the poverty reduction =
30% by 2015 isoquant.
The curvature of the isoquant results from diminishing returns to aid.  Given the
current level of policies in Africa, simply increasing first world concern is not going to
have much impact.  Intuitively, once aid is allocated efficiently, there remain no great
opportunities for effective aid, given the current state of policies.  We argue that the best34
hope for moving to the poverty reduction = 50% isoquant is the combination of policy
reform in Africa and growing concern in rich countries.  If Africa achieved the same level
of policy as South Asia (which seems a realistic target) and first world concern grows at
about the same rate as first world income (3% per year), we would just about make it to
the international development goal for poverty reduction!
Please do not take the point estimates too seriously.  But do take seriously the
notion that global poverty reduction requires a partnership in which third world societies
and governments improve economic policy, while first world citizens and governments
show concern for poverty and translate that concern into effective assistance.35
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Table 1
Growth  and Poverty,  by Region,  Baseline  Scenario
CPIA  Poverty  GNP p.c.  Proj.  Poverty
1996a  Growth  90-96  Growth 2015
Sub-Saharan  Africa  3.04  72%  -0.8  0.1  64%
East  Asia and Pacific  3.78  57%  7.7  5.5  10%
Middle  East/North  Africa  3.58  34%  0.8  1.0  23%
Latin America/Caribbean  3.81  43%  1.0  2.0  26%
Eastern  Europe/Central  Asia  3.22  28%  -5.8  -1.2  43%
South  Asia  3.63  85%  3.3  2.2  40%
Developing  World  3.58  61%  3.2  2.7  31%
a Headcount poverty rate based on $2 per day poverty line.38
Table 2
Dependent variable:  Growth rate of per capita GNP
(1)  1  (2)
Method  OLS  OLS
Panel  Panel
Time Periods (1974-97)
Initial Income  0.67  0.85
(1.08)  (1.49)
Institutional Quality  0.28***  0.27
(1.67)  (1.61)
CPIA  0.46***  0.64**
(1.65)  (2.26)
Aid/GDP  -0.54  --
(1.40)
(Aid/GDP) x CPIA  0.31*  0.18*
(2.94)  (3.06)
(Aid/GDP) 2 -.02  -.036*
(1.60)  (3.07)
N  349  349
R 2 0.37  0.36
*Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
***Significant at the 10 percent level.
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses.  Regional and period dunmmies  included.39
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
199B  Ajd  Pop < $2 a  Mr  oeff  (people  Marg *f  (adj for  Pov efiont
Country  Total  Pop (10 mn)  GDP M%  )  CPIA  daV (%)  /Smn)  ow  blel  aid 1%)
Angola  1.0  2.45  S8%  69.1  68.8  0.6
Benin  0.5  4.15  80%  421.4  520.2  7.3
BotSwana  0.1  0.71  61%  122.0  229.7  4.0
Burkina  Faso  1.0  4.1  j  B6%  520.0  523.0  6.9
Burundi  0.6  5.31  88%  129.2  152.5  5.3
Cameroon  1.3  1.57  58%  292.9  272.3  4.4
Cape Verde  0.0  15.49  57%  -224.7  -649.0  8.6
Cent. Afr. Rep.  0.3  3.41  70%  204.0  295.6  4.8
Chad  0.6  5.07  85%  348.2  407.1  6.7
Comoros  0.0  4.49  64%  91.2  243.0  5.1
Congo, Dem. Rep.  4.1  0.41  71%  424.5  269.8  2.0
Congo, Rep.  0.2  8.86  65%  -119.0  -185.6  4.6
Cote D'Ivolre  1.3  3.91  55%  244.3  223.6  5.5
Djibouti  0.1  ..  ..
Equatorial  Guin.  0.0  2.39  78%  65.7  187.0  2.7
Er;trea  0.3  ..  ..
Ethiopia  5.5  2.90  89%  1,664.4  967.2  8.4
Gabon  0.1  1.51  54%  73.2  150.8  1.1
Gambia, Th9  0.i  ..  74%
Ghana  1.6  2.04  68%  390.5  334.7  5.9
Guinea  0.6  2.45  50%  225.6  262.1  4.7
Guinea-B;Ssau  0.1  15.67  97%  -1,051.1  -2,178.6  7.1
Kenya  2.5  1.91  78%  542.3  402.6  5.3
Lesotho  0.2  3.09  74%  407.2  692.8  8.1
Liberia  0.3  ..  ..
Madagascar  1.3  2.84  93%  669.6  621.5  6.3
Malawi  0.9  7.09  96%  337.3  345.8  8.0
Mal  0.9  6.95  93%  330.7  339.6  7.9
Mauritania  0.2  6.15  68%  150.6  245.8  7.2
Mauritius  0.1  0.19  34%  56.2  114.1  0.0
Mozambique  1.6  9.21  100%  -147.5  -127.3  8.0
Namibia  0.1  2.27  50%  106.3  196.4  3.7
Niger  0.8  2.97  92%  663.2  699.5  6.6
Nigeria  10.5  0.19  60%  668.5  314.9  3.6
Rwanda  0.7  15.75  89%  -1,605.8  -1,807.7  7.0
Sao Tome And Pr.  0.0  ..  ..
Senegal  0.8  4.03  80%  349.4  376.6  7.0
Seychelles  0.0  ..  ..
Sierra Leone  0.4  8.11  77%  -276.0  -361.5  6.3
Somalia  0.9  ..  ..
South Africa  3.6  0.13  50%  98.5  65.5  0.0
Sudan  2.6  ..  ..
Swaziland  0.1  0.99  56%  169.8  374.0  5.0
Tanzania  2.8  4.46  46%  438.1  315.2  6.7
Togo  0.4  2.33  65%  321.0  434.8  6.0
Uganda  1.8  3.34  92%  903.7  748.3  8.9
Zambia  0.9  7.53  98%  245.5  258.6  8.1
Zimbabwe  1.1  1.45  68%  283.6  279.1  4.3
Cambodia  0.9  ..  ..
China  117.7  0.06  58%  247.5  53.8  0.0
Fiji  0.1  1.33  37%  80.1  181.9  2.1
IndoneSaa  18.8  0.16  59%  188.9  73.9  0.0
Ki;rbatl  0.0  ..  ..
Korea, Rep.  4.4  -0.02  30%  33.9  21.1  0.0
Lao, Pdr  0.4  5.73  83%  203.1  264.7  6.6
Malaysia  1.9  -0.20  27%  37.2  30.2  0.0
Marshall Islands  0.0  ..  ..  ..
Micronesia, FS  0.0  ..  ..  ..
Mongolia  0.2  4.34  57%  215.5  341.9  6.9
PapuaNewGuin.  0.4  2.87  58%  128.3  170.5  3.2
Philippines  6.7  0.36  65%  264.0  143.5  0.0
Samoa  0.0  ..  ..  ..40
(t)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
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Solomon  Isl.  0.0  4.79  54%  53.9  156.8  4.8
Thailand  5.8  0.20  24%  46.7  26.6  0.0
Tonga  0.0  ..  ..
Vanualu  0.0  6.36  52%  40.4  151.7  6.3
Vietnam  7.1  0.78  80%  517.1  276.3  4.0
Algena  2.7  0.22  18%  41.6  30.3  0.0
Egypt  5.6  1.31  52%  207.7  119.8  0.0
Jordan  0.4  3.26  24%  59.0  80.2  0.0
Lebanon  0.4  0.96  ..
Morocco  2.6  0.70  20%  72.8  53.9  0.0
Tunisia  0.9  0.29  23%  75.2  78.7  0.0
Yemen, Repub  1.4  1.84  ..
Argentina  3.4  0.08  36%  58.8  39.8  0.0
Belize  0.0  1.87  45%  97.9  339.5  5.4
Bolivia  0.7  3.48  59%
Brazii  15.5  0.04  44%  94.9  39.5  0.0
Chile  1.4  0.12  39%  59.5  53.7  0.0
Colombia  3.6  0.10  22%  47.1  31.4  0.0
Costa Rica  0.3  40.03  44%  101.4  145.6  0.0
Dominica  0.0  ..  48%
Dorinican  Rep.  0.8  0.29  48%  127.9  140.0  0.0
Ecuador  1.1  0.44  66%  111.1  107.8  0.0
El  Salvador  0.5  1.94  52%  230.2  280.4  5.7
Grenada  0.0  2.38  ..
Guatemala  1.0  0.51  77%  245.3  244.9  3.5
Guyana  0.1  6.96  60%  103.4  230.7  7.9
Haiti  0.7  4.51  68%  227.7  256.7  5.5
Honduras  0.6  2.82  76%  328.2  395.3  6.7
Jamaica  0.2  0.66  25%  77.9  121.8  0.0
Mexico  8.8  0.04  40%  67.7  33.7  0.0
Nicaragua  0.4  10.21  75%  68.8r  -90.9  6.6
Panama  0.3  0.46  46%  96.9  150.3  0.0
Paraguay  0.5  0.56  41%  98.7  126.8  0.0
Peru  2.3  0.37  50%  159.7  122.6  0.0
St. Kitts  & Nev  0.0  2.19  S6%  53.2  308.0  6.1
St. Lucia  0.0  4.62  34%  54.1  206.2  6.0
St.  Vinrent  0.0  ..  36%
Trinidad  & Tob.  0.1  0.19  32%  72.4  140.2  0.0
Uruguay  0.3  0.20  34%  65.8  95.3  0.0
Venezuela  2.1  0.02  32%  44.9  35.5  0.0
Albania  0.3  ..  ..
Armenia  0.4  ..  33%
Azerbaijan  0.7  0.93  36%  250.1  275.6  4.0
Beibrs  1.0  0.16  6%  10.7  10.6  0.0
Bosnia  & Herz.  0.4  ..  ..
Bulgaria  0.9  0.46  24%  50.1  52.8  0.0
Croatia  0.5  0.65  ..
Czech Rep.  1.0  0.11  55%  76.9  76.1  0.0
Estonia  0.2  0.91  33Yo  105.6  192.8  2.8
Georgia  0.5  ..  32o
Hungary  1.0  0.26  11%  25.6  25.3  0.0
Kazakhstan  1.7  0.23  12%  49.0  41.6  0.0
Kyrgyz Rep.  0.4  2.45  55%  306.3  395.9  7.2
Latvia  0.3  0.86  30%  117.6  181.3  2.1
Lithuania  0.4  0.54  19%  58.0  79.5  0.0
Macedonia,  FYR  0.2  ..  ..
Moldova  0.4  0.59  31%  202.2  263.9  3.3
Poland  3.8  0.36  15%  41.1  26.7  0.0
Romania  2.3  0.21  71%  162.2  124.5  0.0
Russia  14.8  0.00  11%  27.3  11.5  0.0
Slovak Repub  0.5  0.35  85%  156.1  191.0  2.0
Slovenla  0.2  0.34  ..41
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
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Tajlkistan  0.6  2.12  48%  343.5  412.6  4.9
Turkey  5.9  0.06  48%  109.6  61.9  0.0
Turkmenistan  0.4  0.26  26%  82.4  108.9  0.0
Ukraine  5.2  0.33  31%  120.8  71.4  0.0
Uzbekistan  2.2  0.15  43%  137.8  107.3  0.0
Bangladesh  11.6  1.02  88%  1,034.5  472.1  6.5
Bhutan  0.1  ..  ..
India  89.8  0.13  89%  740.5  175.6  1.0
Maldives  0.0  3.77  57%  162.5  539.4  8.6
Nepal  2.0  1.70  87%  601.0  478.8  5.2
Pakistan  12.3  0.41  57%  434.9  194.9  2.0
Sri Lanka  1.8  1.16  41%  214.4  178.7  2.142
Table  4
Poverty  Efficient  Aid Allocations  with Different  Degrees  of  Population  Bias,  Selected
Countries
Poverty Efficient Aid/GDP (%)
Population Bias Parameter (beta) equals
0  .32  .60
Namibia (1.5 m people)  0.0  3.7  7.4
Benin (5.2 m people)  5.8  7.3  7.9
Uganda (18 m people)  8.3  8.9  8.4
Tanzania (28 m people)  6.2  6.7  6.9
Vietnam (70.9 m people)  4.4  4.0  2.9
India (897.8 m people)  6.1  1.0  0.043
Table 5
Poverty  Rates  by Region,  1996  and 2015,  Various  Scenarios
Poverty  Poverty  2015
1996a  Baseline  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  72%  64%  56%  53%  45%  41%
East Asia  and Pacific  57%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%
Middle  East/North  Africa  34%  23%  29%  29%  29%  29%
Latin America/Caribbean  43%  26%  26%  26%  26%  26%
Eastern  Europe/Central  Asia  28%  43%  41%  38%  37%  34%
South  Asia  85%  40%  39%  37%  39%  37%
Developing  World  61%  31%  30%  29%  28%  26%
a Headcount poverty rate based on $2 per day poverty line.44
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1.  l Alesina  and Dollar  (forthcoming)  show that the allocation  of bilateral aid up to the mid-
1990s  could  be explained  to a large  extent by strategic  variables  including  former  colonial
status and voting  patterns  in the UN. Beyond  this, there  was little consistent  relationship
between  the allocation  of aid and the quality  of economic  policy.
2.  In this formnulation  we make  use of two other results  from Burnside  and Dollar. First, they
consider  the possibility  that policy  is endogenous  and in particular  is influenced  by the  level
of aid, but they  find no significant  effect  of the amount  of aid on policy. Our specification  for
growth  makes  use of this information,  that the policy  measure  is not affected  by the level of
aid and can be taken as independent  of it. Second,  Burnside  and Dollar  consider  the
possibility  that aid is correlated  with the error term in the growth  regression  and instrument
for it. Their OLS  and 2SLS  regressions  are essentially  the same,  indicating  that there is no
significant  correlation  between  aid and the error term. In light of this, we use OLS  to
estimate  the growth  equation.
3.  On the  impact  of aid on policy,  see Collier  (1997),  Killick  (1991),  Rodrick  (1996),  and
Williamson  (1994),  and Dollar  and Svensson  (forthcoming).  For empirical  evidence  on the
fungibility  of aid, see Feyzioglu,  Swaroop,  and Zhu (1998)  and Pack and Pack (1993).
4.  We have  left India  out of this calculation  of actual  aid and of the total aid in our optimal
allocation. India  is so large that small  changes  in parameters  make large differences  in the
absolute  volume  of aid to the country  in our model. To make this comparison  of total aid in
reality  and total aid in our model  fairly  robust,  it is necessary  to exclude  India. For the same
reason  we exclude  it in the comparison  of volumes  of aid under different  scenarios  in Figure
1.
5.  The way that we distributed  the  policy reform  around Africa  and ECA is as follows:
Referring  to Table 1, the ratio of policy  in South Asia  to SSA (ECA)  is 3.63/3.014  = 1.19
(3.63/3.22  = 1.13). We scaled  up policy  in SSA  (ECA)  by the factor 1.19  (1.13),  so that the
population-weighted  average  of policy in each region  would  now  be 3.63. This method
means  that the absolute  change  in policy is larger  in countries  that already  have better policy.
In general,  the effect of policy reform  on poverty  reduction  would  be greater if the reform
were concentrated  in countries  with very bad policy. A counterfactual  scenario  that put more
of the policy  reform  in the countries  with very poor policy  would  generate  a higher  impact  of
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